as a doomed cult and historicize it within the context of black religion in the United States. As Moore observes, its "large African American membership, coupled with its message of social justice and racial equality, all reflected the activism of urban black churches in the 1960s and 1970s" (Understanding 7). Jones also drew inspiration from Father Divine, a charismatic African American spiritual leader and entrepreneur whose Philadelphia-based International Peace Mission movement operated a housing and feeding program for the poor, who, Jones observed in a booklet likely composed in 1957, "sincerely put into practice Acts 2 which required that the believers live together and hold all things in common" (16) . This account of Peoples Temple's racially integrated communalism helps to make sense of its significant African American membership. In this regard, Moore claims that "the majority of Jonestown's residents were black, and African Americans held key leadership positions in the jungle outpost" ("Demographics").
However, Moore's and other's histories largely do not consider how the Peoples Temple's narratives of social transformation and Mosaic exodus into a promised land are crucially situated within the context of settler colonialism and specifically within what Patrick Wolfe calls its "logic of elimination" of indigenous peoples (387). "Whatever settlers may say," writes Wolfe, "the primary motive for elimination is not race (or religion, ethnicity, grade of civilization, etc.) but access to territory. Territoriality is settler colonialism's specific, irreducible element" (388). In contrast, Moore's account does not discuss indigenous presence in Guyana but instead uncritically repeats the language of indigenous erasure used by US Ambassador to Guyana, Maxwell Krebs, who described talking with "several of the 'pioneers' about their living conditions (uncomfortable), work (tough), aspirations (high), etc." (Understanding 44). By viewing Jonestown members as hard-working "pioneers" of a South American "City Upon a Hill," we fail to see how Jonestown, as a settler-colonial enterprise, involved the foreclosure of indigenous futures even as it allowed its members to "play Indian" and ultimately be apotheosized by Jones in that role.
I examine indigenous erasure and its temporal implications in the work of Guyanese novelist and poet Fred D'Aguiar. His understudied book-length poem Bill of Rights (1998) depicts a survivor's experience during and following the 18 November 1978 mass suicide and killings. Highlighting the hemispheric linkages of Jonestown to both the United States and Britain, D'Aguiar's long poem reframes the coloniality of Jones's enterprise in terms of the long-term psychic damage it has done, and continues to do, to individual subjects. In such a reframing, there are echoes of Wilson Harris's 1949 article "The Reality of Trespass" and his idea that processes of colonization are always marked by the tragic or "an anguish of longing" for the "past security" of abandoned homelands despite, or more precisely because of, the colonizer's failure to achieve "genuine release and change . . . in a new soil and a new world" (21). D'Aguiar's poetic treatment of Jonestown also underscores how Jones's compound was a settler colonial enterprise not only in its liberatory fantasies but in its biblical rhetoric of newness. In a 1999 interview, D'Aguiar stresses his aim of situating the poem within the context of Guyana's colonial past and asserts that "the post-colonial has robbed the ex-colony of its continuing colonial dependence by theorising the story out of the situation of the colonial consciousness." In doing so, D'Aguiar aims to recover narratives of Guyana as a space of both liberation and colonial extraction, "to put both back into that situation" ("Poetry") narrated in Bill of Rights.
Bill of Rights's poetics reveal the necessity of the apocalyptic within settlercolonial ways of reckoning time and the ways in which settler-colonial, apocalyptic time confounds projects of healing or recovering from historical trauma. My reading responds to arguments such as Fiona Darroch's that attribute redemptive possibilities to literary representations of Jonestown's historical trauma. Describing anamnesis as "reconstructive remembrance" (63), for instance, Darroch assigns to it a redemptive power "to heal the past" (81) such that "the repetition of . . . horrors maintains their meaning but also highlights the possibilities of survival, and the ability to re-create" (xxv). Her sense that imaginative literature may perform transformative rituals of anamnesis aimed at healing historical wounds hinges on a particular kind of poetics: one where "the ability to recreate" as an epistemological matter of language or representation intersects with an ontological process of making over a wounded present. Bill of Rights engages with this restorative poetics but complicates its possible efficacy by representing a fragmented and increasingly incoherent post-traumatic subject. The key point here is that the "post-traumatic" in the poem should be historicized as stemming from settler colonialism's exterminatory logic and its apocalyptic temporality that extends not only to indigenous people but also to the poem's nonindigenous speaker, to other members of the Peoples Temple, and to Jones himself.
Temporal Dimensions of Jonestown
Bill of Rights's double-voiced lyrical engagement with imagined events in Jonestown before and after the November 1978 calamity constructs a selfalienated speaker whose "triangular journey," as Hena Maes-Jelineck writes, evokes not only the African slave trade through recalled experiences in Brixton, Chattanooga, and Kalamazoo but also a "persistent mind enslavement" unique to modernity (211). Drawing a connection between Jones's cult of personality and William Blake's "mind-forg'd manacles," Maes-Jelineck conflates modernity with objectivizing ideologies of industrialization and conquest that make possible the theory and practice of slavery.
1 Indeed, the flight of D'Aguiar's speaker to Guyana echoes the claustrophobic conditions aboard a slave ship, with the speaker "among / The agile ones, curled in the overhead/ Luggage compartment" (Bill 2). Maes-Jelineck's argument further positions D'Aguiar's poetry as a "polyphonic instrument" that maps "the extraordinary cultural diversity and resources of the English language in Britain and, in the process, asserting the people's human rights" (212). However, her reading leaves unclear exactly how D'Aguiar's poetic strategies assert "the people's human rights," who these people are, or what their rights might be. Her argument likewise leaves unanswered the question of whether poetic polyphony, however skillfully deployed, is capable of interrupting tyrannical ideologies such as Jones's. Absent from this discussion of D'Aguiar's poem, and of anamnesis more broadly, is an account of its representational limits, in the face of settler coloniality, for both present-and future-making.
The literary project of healing historical trauma is vexed by complexities and contingencies not only of representation but also of trauma and the temporal frames from which it stems. Bill of Rights's fictional persona, having escaped death at Jonestown, suffers from the compulsion to repetitively reenact his experiences there. Furthermore, his repetition, although aimed at psychic healing and wholeness, ends up reproducing the trauma, with the poem fracturing into multiple voices as an enactment of his dissolution. The theory of reiterative performance that D'Aguiar's poem advances, then, is one of failure rather than liberation: a bill of rights enumerated and desired but unlived and, perhaps, unlivable. It is in this sense of a foreclosing of conditions for the present coherence of the subject that I use the term futurity in my title. Eve Tuck and Rubén Gaztambide-Fern andez assert that settler futurity requires, pro forma, the "continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land" (80). I also take these definitional statements to be apt descriptions of the temporal dimensions of Jonestown.
The failed anamnesis of D'Aguiar's poem stems from an eradicatory logic intrinsic to settler colonialism and its foreclosing of indigenous futures. The failures of Bill of Rights's speaker to remember and form a stable subjectivity in the present are outcomes of the temporal structure on which Jones drew to found his apocalyptic heaven on earth. As Jodi Byrd describes, the neocolonial context of Jonestown remains a site of collective memory and contention for the Guyanese: "In Guyana's national memory, Jonestown represents a U.S. state within their state, an unwanted global North encampment of quasi-sovereignty that existed liminally between the borders of the national and the international" (79). Byrd's assessment of Jonestown as a "state within" the Guyanese state arguably overstates its legal status. Yet the clearing of the Guyanese rainforest by Peoples Temple's "workers of the land" in order to found a "Promised Land" draws on colonialist tropes of indigenous lands as uninhabited spaces in which to fulfill the biblical command to "be fruitful, and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it" ("Q1053-1"). Here, Jones's effusive account reveals an apocalyptic logic with both spatial and temporal dimensions. Jones asserts the territorial holdings ("several senior citizen homes, several convalescent homes, a catfish pond filled with catfish") and span of the Peoples Temple as protections against state encroachment ("we have a place beautifully in the uh, jungles of South America"). In doing so, he not only declares a limit to state sovereignty over his followers but also implies an ending of state temporality with the beginning of his own quasi-state and its neocolonial activities. It makes little difference, if we remain within Jones's logic, that the jungle compound was built on leased land. His followers' clearcutting and torching of hundreds of acres of rainforest effectively performed the fantasy of terra nullius, a principle underlying the European Doctrine of Discovery that Robert J. Miller describes as "lands . . . possessed by no one, or which were occupied but not being used in a manner European legal systems recognized" (864).
An interview with Mike Touchette, one of the first Peoples Temple members to go to Guyana, reveals the rhetorical importance of this principle quite starkly when he says, "Plain and simple, we built a city out of nowhere. Our goal was to become self-sufficient in every aspect of life, from food to clothing to fuel" (Fondakowski 197 ). As we will see, the limitations of language in confronting the ongoing conditions of colonialism appear through D'Aguiar's depiction of a settler-colonial time that remains vital, and vitally disabling, despite the ending of both Jones's life and his Guyanese settlement.
The Politics and Poetics of Traumatic Remembering
Jones often described the world outside of Jonestown as unchanging in its evil, a kind of outward sprawl of injustices. Historical time, for Jones, was a bad dream from which death was the only means to awake. "It's the will of Sovereign Being that this happened to us," Jones intoned just before the cyanide was administered, "that we lay down our lives in protest against what's been done. That we lay down our lives to protest in what's being done." He goes on to describe the world as unchangingly and pervasively corrupt: "The criminality of people, the cruelty of people. . . . There's, there's no point, there's no point to this. We are born before our time. They won't accept us." Here, Jones appears as someone who can only read negatively the overwhelming sameness of history's traumas, which is his rationale for the rejection of futurity itself, leading to the killing of Jonestown's children: "And I don't think we should sit here and take any more time for our children to be endangered, for if they come after our children and we give them our children, then our children will suffer forever" ("Q042"). Here, the self-imposed apocalypse is a foregone conclusion and an alibi for the neocolonial crimes committed on his followers.
Inspired by such future-oriented rationales for committing violence in the present, D'Aguiar's representational strategies construct a historically specific, radically disintegrative and alienated vision of language and subjectivity. By Bill of Rights's closing pages, we see the speaker isolated and despairing of his cultural dislocation despite his efforts to testify to the events in Jonestown and, in so doing, remake himself as a whole person. In testifying to Jones's madness and to his own violent participation in the Guyanese Peoples Temple, his sense of self seems to have only further disintegrated. Such collapse invites the question of whether the repetition of historical trauma, even in fictive form, necessarily creates further suffering. One answer to this question involves the vexed relation between language and the body.
D'Aguiar's own comments on his poem suggest that he views the trauma survivor's testimony as contingent on, and continually vexed by, a sort of evacuation of the subject. One of D'Aguiar's figures for this evacuation is the scar. At the end of his 1998 lecture, "Made in Guyana," D'Aguiar reflects on the historical and psychic wounds that Jonestown inflicted: "The Guyanese interior was bruised by the Jonestown settlement but it is now overgrown and returned to the wild. The scar is not physical in terms of landscape-that has healed-but human, and psychic. Once you know about Jonestown, how can you trust ideology or charisma or have faith again? A body and mind are emptied of all three" (13). For D'Aguiar, the condition of knowing trauma, even trauma experienced secondhand, amounts to a decisive loss that is at once cataclysmic and empowering. It is cataclysmic because it signals a rupture-"a body and mind . . . emptied" of trust in "ideology or charisma" or "faith"-and empowering because traumatic knowing creates critical consciousness. D'Aguiar's trauma survivor, having been "emptied" by both physical and psychical violence, is no longer caught or, it seems, catchable within the spell of ideology.
This hopeful reading of traumatic knowing becomes complicated by D'Aguiar's depictions of traumatic embodiment. In both "Made in Guyana"
and Bill of Rights, the body and the natural world appear as sites of both departure from and return to the historical dimension. Describing a child's sense of the physical world and the limitations of language, D'Aguiar writes that it is "as if words alone are never enough for what you have to say, and what your body must do about this and that, with this body and that body, and this thing and that thing, and here, there and everywhere all at once, and right now before time runs out and words go out of season" ("Made" 3). Here, the urgency of embodiment accompanies language in creating meaning; it also threatens to surpass or overwhelm language's power to mean, to create coherence. The body emerges again and again in D'Aguiar's writing as the site of a repetition compulsion that, read positively, also becomes the site of cultural witnessing and transformation of historical trauma. The narrator of D'Aguiar's novel about the Middle Passage, Feeding the Ghosts (1997), pronounces-after slaves aboard the ship Zong have been thrown overboard, consumed by the sea, and transformed into elements of wave and air-that, even in death, they "will have to be a witness again" (5). Despite the suppression of historical memories of the Middle Passage, in other words, its victims must be made to speak, to bear witness, and D'Aguiar locates their possibility for speaking in the natural world.
The act of witnessing that attends Bill of Rights enacts a poetics of language in extremis as a kind of useless tool, reduced to meaningless repetition and recombinations in the face of brute physical force. The poem's double-voicing, signaled through italicized and nonitalicized typefaces, at first promises a stable subject formation by engaging in what Edouard Glissant, in writing about the coexistence of colonial and precolonial languages in a single nation, terms diglossia or fruitful intertextuality: "[N]either fusion nor confusion, if it is to be fruitful and capable of transcendence, the languages that end up involved in it must first have been in charge of their own specificities" (118). Indeed, D'Aguiar's speaker's multiple selves correspond to what Victor Turner, following Arnold Van Gennep, describes as a ritual process of initiatory exuberance, liminal anxiety, and reintegrated stability (94-95). These selves also correspond tonally to the weird ecstasies and traumas of the Jonestown experience and are indeed many-voiced. The poem also invokes calypso song ("Water in the well . . . / Is not the truth I a-tell, / Is pure lie") (D'Aguiar, Bill 23) among many other musical genres, including 1970s British reggae (Steel Pulse), American pop (Fine Young Cannibals), and contemporary jazz (Cassandra Wilson). Biblical references and registers (or their inversion, as in "Holy the serpent of temptation / Holy Pontius Pilate holy Judas Iscariot" [6]) appear alongside pop culture artifacts (Kodak Instamatics, Seiko watches, and "nunchakas," for example). Despite these many intertexts and cultural specificities, Bill of Rights's speaker is rarely "in charge" of such meanings. Instead, these cultural artifacts form a brittle collage assembled under duress, a kind of ersatz and distracted subjectivity culled out of fragments that subside from the speaker's consciousness as quickly as they arise.
As the poem goes on, the motion of its world starts to spin radically out of control. When its speaker is most "out of [his] carnivorous brain," language's representational capacities start to strain under his psychological burdens and traumas. Describing his jealousy at having his lover taken by Jones for his own, the speaker ruefully notes Jones's predilection for virgins: Jones is "aroused by my girl's obvious / Plural virginity" (31). The speaker's world then turns cartoonish, and he feels "like Coyote, always out of reach / Of roadrunner" when he sees a jeep, a tangible contact with the outside world, "overshoot / This commune" (32), the air filling with the jeep's/roadrunner's "beep-beep." Elsewhere, doing violence to others "on a mission" in nearby Georgetown, the speaker runs into a demonstration, presumably against Jim Jones and his followers. Breaking his "stave of greenheart" and "nunchakas too," the speaker's italicized voice goes on callously to boast that he was "unhurt by their women screaming / Unhurt by their children crying." The people that he encounters and assaults are only occasions for the speaker's glib deployment of pop slogans, "souls" who, "discontented" and "ungrateful," are, like the macho persona that the speaker adopts when he is at his most violent, "cruisin'-for-a-bruisin'" (36). It is under extreme pressure, then, that D'Aguiar's speaker is most heteroglossic and least transcendent. In moments of most extreme crisis, when the violence of his situation is most imminent, his narration turns paranoiacally repetitive.
These lines recall Primo Levi's description of the liberation of the Buna concentration camp, as it appears in Giorgio Agamben's Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (1999). Agamben recounts Levi's description of a threeyear-old boy called Hurbinek who repeated a single word over and over again, "a word that no one in the camp can understand and that Levi transcribes as massklo or matisklo." This word remains "obstinately secret": an instance of what Agamben calls a "non-language" (38) and a demonstration of how testimony is joined to the silence of this boy's "dark and maimed language" (37). "It was not," writes Levi, "always exactly the same word, but it was certainly an articulated word; or better, several slightly different articulated words, experimental variations of a theme, on a root, perhaps even on a name" (192) . Such variations, such moments of non-language, appear in Bill of Rights's italicized anaphoras and in the paranoid loops they create, a foreclosing of both present and future coherence.
As with Hurbinek, the repetitions of D'Aguiar's speaker appear as privacies of the speaker's mind: attempts to recuperate a language that has been distorted beyond recognition by the life of the camp. The repetitive phrasings of D'Aguiar's speaker read, in other words, like a privacy turned nightmarish. They resemble tortured schoolbook grammar exercises-or, to use a reference fitting for Bill of Rights, Mad Libs, a word game where the arbitrary filling in of parts of speech into a simple narrative is supposed to make for comic surprise-which create for Bill of Rights's survivor a litany that has been both evacuated of meaning and that becomes, nevertheless, a limited consolation:
What came to pass Has come to pass Has come and gone Came and went What came to pass That has not always passed Already came and passed What comes must pass . . . (17) Shuffling through the grammatical permutations of his original phrase, "And God like a man in our midst / Telling what came to pass" (17), the speaker's repetitions form a slipshod song to himself: a childlike consolation whose impotence is apparent in the face of Jones's physical and mental abuses.
Given the speaker's encounter with a "feisty griot" who provides him with "a story full of the warm South" (14) and a lullaby played on the bone flute left over from a devoured canary, these repetitions also read like hollowed-out or ineffectual chants. In representing ritual chanting in his poem, D'Aguiar conflates the typically West African figure of the griot, or praise singer, with that of the distinctly Amerindian bone flute. Harris comments on the latter figure in the preface to his 1960 novel, The Palace of the Peacock, noting that the "Carib bone flute" is metaphorically both the "spirit-bone of water" of Guyana's numerous rivers and literally a flute "hollowed from the bone of an enemy in time of war" from which "specters arose" (9). In D'Aguiar's poem, the griot denies this spirit bone to the speaker, devouring the canary from which it might be fashioned and leaving the speaker with nothing. Indeed, by the poem's conclusion, the speaker confesses to having failed to "hollow an enemy's bone / Into a flute" (Bill 130). Instead, he has become a kind of bone flute himself, capable only of mimicking or channeling others' music and unable to resist the ventriloquism not just of Jones but of all influences. The poem's many discursive registers finally overwhelm and deny the possibility of subjective coherence and signal the breakdown of any meaningfully intersubjective future.
Indeed, what becomes ever more conspicuously absent in Bill of Rights is a community that responds. Devoid of a griot's historical and religious effectiveness, the speaker's use of repetition also lacks the dialogical element of a griot's performance, as the speaker can only respond to his own calls through italicized speech. The epistolary format of the poem, with each "entry" standing as a letter to the speaker's friend in Brixton, "L-," further underscores the speaker's isolation, as does the revelation that "L-" has been "cut down by the big C; / My letters to him, all wait for me" (124). Resigned and alone, the circle closes and the only addressee for the speaker's letters, his acts of witnessing, is himself.
Prior to this revelation, though, the speaker's monologic situation moves him to turn to the land itself as companion and addressee. Often in his failed chants, it is the natural world that appears anaphorically, as when the speaker, having given up on recovering his lost Seiko wristwatch, locates a new source of temporal orientation in the sun:
Light hoods our eyes Light creases our foreheads Light makes our bones porous Light darkens our skin Light peels our heads Light lifts us off the ground Light puts us underground (43) The speaker's use of anaphora here attempts to create meaning out of a scene that is meaningless to him. These lines are, again, satirical versions of shamanistic song or chanting. Their satire consists in the fact that, as so often happens in this poem, the formal acting out of a transcendent gesture does not guarantee that it will be meaningful, let alone transcendent. In his hunger for a spiritual father, for release from that father and from Jonestown, and for literal food, his language gets pulled inexorably toward primal and bodily reference points such as light, belly, and fire. Working in the fields, he imagines being utterly self-sufficient, living off the land with his "fingers [as] my knife and fork," using "grass to wipe my ass." However, this nativist fantasy quickly gives way to simple hunger, "a growl / In my belly and my belly on my mind." Quickly, the hunger consumes all else-dreams, mother, father, wife, children-until the speaker is left, at the end of language's meaningfulness, in a tautology of simple physical need: "My belly in my belly" (45). Here, physical necessity reduces language to a condition of impotence. It is also, however, the means by which language, to use D'Aguiar's phrase, becomes "emptied" ("Made" 13) of its former meanings.
This evacuation is the initiatory moment in the ritual of anamnesis that the poem stages, a moment of evacuation and separation from language's protective and enclosing properties, and of confrontation with a physical world that is more than just, to use Harris's phrase, "the Void of civilization" (Jonestown) . This initiatory moment is equivalent to breaking the spell of ideology that Walter Benjamin calls taking "control of a memory" in a "moment of danger" (225), a moment and a political situation of emergency that is essentially ongoing. Part of the uniqueness of D'Aguiar's version of the poetics of memory, though, lies in his engagement with the natural world in the ritual process of recalling the past. In D'Aguiar's Jonestown, language's mimetic power is doubly threatened by ideology and by the material world's capacity to trump any imagined world, again and again. Thus, the speaker's physical expulsion from the false Eden in Guyana parallels an epistemological expulsion from an Adamic paradise, where the right names correspond faithfully to the things of the world. Expelled from meaning by violence, thrown back upon the physical world in its brutal and raw materiality, D'Aguiar's speaker is banished into a double wilderness: into the literal jungle of Guyana and into the figurative jungle of meaninglessness.
This double expulsion appears most trenchantly when the speaker addresses his lover. Near the end of Bill of Rights, we see the speaker, through a poem, addressing his lost beloved, an indigenous woman, with whom he fell in love while at Jonestown, but whom Jones raped and impregnated. Reduced to sound and tautology, the speaker's language becomes the "poetry" that struggles not only to assert his desperate longing for his long-unnamed lover but also to transcend the "despotic authority" that the speaker does not even have the "dreads to shake at." So he professes melodramatically to his lover that "When poetry dies my love for you dies too" (54).
2 This profession of faith in language's ability to transcend its historical situation gets twisted, derailed by its ending, when the speaker meanders away from a defiant expression of "us versus timelessness" to a formulation where the distinctly Jonesian timelessness is equated with love itself:
Our love no less than time no more Than life itself us in that love With nothing to lose if we lose our lives Since that love has slipped from time From Death and lives as life itself (55) The incantation here insinuates Jones's talk of "revolutionary suicide" into what begins as a declaration of love's power to revolt against the eradication of time or against Jones's denial of any world or history beyond his Guyana compound. What this love poem suggests is that Jones's rhetoric and its trajectory of displacement and distraction cannot be countered through language alone; indeed, language repeats Jones's ideology even when it sets out to be most subversive. This is maybe the key ethical and aesthetic risk that D'Aguiar's poem assigns to reimagining the traumatic past. At both the level of the fictional persona, caught in the act of narrating and remembering Jonestown, and at the level of the poem, which involves us as witnesses to its own act of witness, there is the constant threat of representing the past in ways that dull or mute its violence. This risk also underscores the need for language to be ritually evacuated of its prior meanings in order for it to become useful for the making of a stable self.
Indigenous Presences, Wild Resistances
The colonial context of Bill of Rights informs the speaker's performance in literal and figurative ways. The earth, the Guyanese jungle, is a presence that literally destabilizes both the speaker and the Peoples Temple. Figuratively, the continuing presence of colonization appears in the contrast between the Jonestown project and a backgrounded indigenous presence that the poem imagines in terms of the land itself. For instance, the pervasive humidity of the jungle complicates the speaker's efforts to enjoy the quasi-militaristic aspects of his Jonestown identity. The rain "rusts our joints" (6) and leaves the speaker prematurely "arthritic at thirty-three," with an uzi "seized" by "damp everywhere" and himself with "the runs and chigoe, / A fungus culture between [his] toes" (34). The Guyanese land likewise resists the community-building efforts of Jonestown to make livable dwellings, with the jungle's "autochthonous wood" blunting or breaking "electric / Saw after electric saw / In half." This wood, the speaker concludes, in a blurring of the physical and the psychic, the historical and the mythical, "must have hardened itself / Against further loss of face" (7). In another rapid catalogue, processes of colonization, exploitation, and pollution are collapsed and accelerated. The Jonestown presence in Guyana is likened to less than a wave of the hand to dismiss a mosquito:
To wave a mosquito from the forehead Takes more effort than to clear this forest Clear this continent of all of its wood Burn that wood into smoke into cloud Spread that cloud over the entire planet Sink our planet into a black hole Send that hole spinning into unknown space (5) That this clearing process figures so early in the speaker's Jonestown experience suggests his sense of the fragility of Jonestown's neocolonial presence, a sense of its belatedness or at least of its pathetic reenactment of the Spanish conquistadors' destruction of indigenous cultures and landscapes (the speaker likens his machete to a "cutlass" that "bounces off" the jungle's vines [24] ). Perhaps the Guyanese jungle's most powerful resistance to colonial encroachments is its stubborn capacity simply to outlast what is human.
In light of these frustrations that the natural world presents to the poem's speaker, and taking into account D'Aguiar's remarks on the body and the material world as originating and revisionary sites for human meaning, it would seem that a return to wilderness, to the Guyanese jungle stripped of its toxic human presences, would make possible a journey toward subjective recuperation and renewal. This journey would also be a metonym for Guyanese decolonization. Indeed, D'Aguiar's reading of Harris's encounter with nature seems to support this view of the recuperative power of the natural world. "The difference between Harris's vision and that of the Romantics," writes D'Aguiar, "is that nature, in a Wilson Harris novel, not only instructs us in its many contradictory truths, it also alters how we perceive those truths" ("Made" 5). D'Aguiar's description of Harris's "vision" underscores the animate and pedagogical qualities of "nature." However, elsewhere in D'Aguiar's and Harris's writings, the natural world's "contradictory truths" and recuperative power appear more ambivalent. In Harris's experimental novel Da Silva Da Silva's Cultivated Wilderness and Genesis of the Clowns (1978), for instance, the figure of the "wildernesse" necessarily, even compulsively, entails a confrontation with the violence of the past. It is the deeply storied landscape that the titular character, a "mad painter," tries to capture with his art, which requires a compulsive excavation in "wildernesse" flesh and blood; and a confrontation dawns with soluble uniform that sticks to the psychology of each historic body in cradle or grave; a confrontation that may encourage the arousal of daemonic forces as freedom (bent upon the creation of genuine freedom) or may succumb to the inevitability or refinement of violence. (73) D'Aguiar's protagonist undertakes something like this archaeological dig out of physical necessity. The jungle confronts him with both physical and emotional hardships that lead to a reassessment of his relationship to Jones. For both D'Aguiar and Harris, then, the dialogue that Harris's "wildernesse" demands entails a transformation of our human relations not just with the natural world but also with one another. It is a confrontation with "historic bod[ies]" and minds to which history's violences "stick," a confrontation with ancestors and ancestral places that continue to haunt us. This "wildernesse," or the Guyanese interior in the case of Jonestown, stands not as an inert object or void but always as an agent for the potential redemption of human destructiveness. As Harris puts it in Jonestown (2011), "The Wilderness comes into its own as extra-human territory which unsettles the hubris of a human-centered cosmos that has mired the globe since the Enlightenment." Its continual excavation, for D'Aguiar and Harris alike, is an excavation of our own relationship to historical trauma and to the violence of colonialism.
For Harris, there is more at stake than just the recovery of a historical and colonial past, as his fictional narrator, Francisco Bone, suggests in Jonestown's "Letter from Francisco Bone to W.H." There, Bone describes the consequences of surviving Jonestown as requiring one to engage not just the historically recent past but also a mythic past that opens up: "It is essential," he writes, "to create a jigsaw in which 'pasts' and 'presents' and likely or unlikely 'futures' are the pieces that multitudes in the self employ in order to bridge chasms in historical memory." Bone calls this creation of a memorial "jigsaw" the practice of "Memory theatre." He goes on to describe this sort of remembering as an immersion in traumas rather than a rejection of them as both the antithesis of, and remedy for, a sort of overdetermined identity or "predatory coherence":
The trauma that I suffered in Jonestown may have imprisoned me absolutely in a plot of fate. But thank God! it aroused me instead to contemplate a hidden mathematics within the body of language. . . . Language is deeper than 'frames', it transgresses against the frames that would make us prisoners of eternity in the name of one creed or dogma or ideology. (Jonestown) P e x a This journey back to the "hidden mathematics" of chaos in language itself leads Francisco Bone to write his "Dream Book," which he dreamed of "translating from a fragmented text or texts that already existed." For Bone, these fragmented texts, in turn, are residues or "apparitions" not just of a colonial past but of the "hidden textualities" of a pre-Columbian place (Jonestown) .
D'Aguiar's speaker undertakes a similar project to that of Bone. His unanswered letters effectively form the long poem we read as the text of Bill of Rights, narrating his attempt to escape his own "plot of fate" (Harris, Jonestown) through poetic means: multivocality, anaphoric chanting, and love poems and letters to worlds that are discursively beyond and apart from Jonestown. When faced with the wilderness of the jungle surrounding Jonestown, he also attempts to bridge historical and mythic memory, Guyanese natives and Jonestown outsiders, as seen in his fraught relations with Tikka and with the oddly displaced, recurring Aztec figure of Quetzalcoatl. In effect, these "hidden textualities" of precontact Guyana become just another text, another material, with which to constructively bridge the internal fracturing that results from the speaker's experience of violence. Rather than having language transgress, in some completely successful way, the "frames" of history, D'Aguiar shows us that its necessarily partial and provisional transgressions must proceed through an ethical reorientation that is sponsored, in an almost shamanic way and as a facilitator of the ritual process, by the presence of Guyanese land and its human and nonhuman inhabitants.
Moving from the jungle to the sea, we might find that the imagining of wilderness as an ethical catalyst appears in explicit ways in D'Aguiar's own novel about the Middle Passage, Feeding the Ghosts. Its opening scene dramatizes the 1781 massacre aboard the slave ship Zong, when, over the course of several days, 132 enslaved Africans were thrown overboard. After Captain Cunningham orders his reluctant first mate, Kelsal, to throw the first two people into the sea, a long description follows in which the elements-the wind and water-assume a voice and a presence that do not threaten remonstrance of the crews' murders but rather a radical disorientation. The voice of the wind filling the ship's sails speaks what the voiceless slaves below decks already know: it "knew Africa and how this sea was nowhere and how their destination was not a beginning but an end without ending" (27). In effect, the wilderness of the sea in its "knowing" creates, or reflects accurately, the cosmic and ethical disorientations of empire. The practices of slavery and colonization, and the genocidal logic that supports them, are known by the natural world to be a kind of living death, a permanent condition of lostness:
The voice above deck knew . . . that if the sea came to an end and another land suggested itself to them they would be lost forever but not dead, lost but never to be found. And love would be nowhere: behind them and impossible to recover; a flat line in the wake of the ship where the sky bowed down to the sea or the sea ascended into the sky. Love was lost somewhere in the very sea with its limitless capacity to swallow love, slaves, ships, memories. (27) The wilderness here voices the historical and ethical dimensions that Captain Cunningham's order attempts tyrannically to silence. However, does the Bill of Rights's speaker have access to this sort of ethical knowing? Do his invocations of the body and the natural world allow him access to a coherent subjectivity, a safe dwelling in the house of language?
As we have seen, the subjectivity at the poem's conclusion is, despite the speaker's best attempts, disintegrated and is so despite the availability of what Harris's character, Francisco Bone, calls the mythic. In the poem, this dimension appears in the visionary and mundane presences of indigenous persons. They are, however, no more and no less effective than any of the other cultural intertexts-whether from indigenous, African, British, or US popular culture-that are available to the speaker. Although D'Aguiar effectively levels historical and mythic events, he does not give us a poetics of play but instead performs an anti-poetics, a view of language's failure to cohere. Despite the availability of materials out of which to forge a coherent subjectivity, the speaker is unable to recover from all he has experienced in Jonestown. He witnesses the repeated wounding of love's body: the speaker's rape and sodomizing of young girls on the compound; his loss of Tikka who, after giving birth (the father, Jones learns, is not him but the speaker), takes her child to the Mazaruni River and to an ambiguous and probably fatal end; and finally, his administering of the cyanide cocktail: "Drink, I was ordering them, Drink / As I tapped out that tune on the trigger" (16). Rather than shoring up subjectivity, these violently interwoven events only lead to the speaker's condition of constant debilitation. This debilitation is a negative form of what Turner calls liminality, or that "passage from lower to higher status . . . through a limbo of statuslessness" (97), and suggests that the main traumatic effect of Jonestown's form of apocalyptic time was to consign its members to a state of permanent in-betweenness.
Occupying the Liminal
If we consider that D'Aguiar's fictional Jonestown survivor attempts to undergo a ritual process of separation, transition, and reincorporation, and that Bill of Rights performs itself as a stalled ritual of anamnesis, then a picture emerges of the poem's speaker occupying a permanently liminal condition. Even after his reincorporation into British and American cultures, he is haunted by memories of the Jonestown dead in ways that linguistic remembering cannot exorcise. Bill of Rights, in other words, dramatizes a stunted ritual in which a final reincorporation into the social order and its possible futures has been foreclosed, and in its place, a perpetual limbo has been substituted.
Still, something like a bill of rights emerges, however slowly, out of the foreclosed future of D'Aguiar's poem and the reiterative ritual it enacts. Those rights ultimately include the right to suffer, even relentlessly, as a means for transforming past traumas. They include, of course, the right to a view onto an ever-opening horizon that is at least somewhat protected from the encroachments of ideology through acts of memory. That is, after his initial enthusiasm for Jonestown wears away, and after the physical and emotional violence of the place wear him down, D'Aguiar's protagonist is forced to pass through a meaninglessness that is located where the natural world confronts a human language that has grown horrifically narrow. At these crossroads, an evacuation occurs: only once language and its speaker are emptied of meaning can the process of reconstruction begin.
D'Aguiar thus represents post-traumatic reconstruction as being necessarily partial, inherently incomplete. While the poetic persona of Bill of Rights survives Jonestown's mass suicide and murders, he eventually ends up back in the United States. There, in his "first hotel since Jonestown," he throws out the Gideon bible and reads the phonebook, visited by "the Devil" having "his way / With us, with or without butter" (D'Aguiar, Bill 122). Here, the suggestion that Jonestown was itself a kind of hotel instead of a jungle compound suggests linkages between Jonestown, the United States' transitory places and lifestyles, and settlercolonial temporality. This rape vision does not end but only closes with the suggestion of its ongoing repetition, an eternal recurrence: "It was a case of rock me again / And again, and again, and again, / And again, and again." Elsewhere, the speaker is in Augusta, Maine, a shut-in only visited regularly by his "friend," a prostitute who gives him "a discount for her love" (133). Even there, a specter himself, he is haunted by the Jonestown dead, feeling himself to be walking "over a thousand dead" and fearing to move at all, lest the "pattern" of their dying overflow his memory, spill over into the present, and "scramble into a town full of dead" (128). These hauntings point to how Jonestown's exterminatory temporality is not place-bound but reaches and infects many locations, cutting off affective access even to places the speaker has never been before.
Likewise, the close of the poem reveals how the speaker is also cut off from his other past places and from the more stable identity or identities they represent. Before moving back to the United States from London, he is a patient in a psychiatric hospital: his "new address-/ Denmark Hill," is the site of King's College's Institute of Psychiatry. From his "locked ward," he hears trains "clackety-clack to somewhere" he "can't go: Chattanooga, Kalamazoo / Or even Timbuctoo" (132). Although his healing process is incomplete, the speaker's physical and emotional journeys allow us to contemplate not only Jonestown's physical brutality but also its circumscribed temporality from a new angle. As such, these journeys fulfill in a deeply provisional way the recuperative function that D'Aguiar reads as being so crucial for Harris's work, presenting to us as an act of contemplation, "the opportunity for a reassessment of our present stance and past actions" (D'Aguiar, "Made" 6). The cultural and personal healings D'Aguiar depicts are necessarily provisional because to be otherwise would entail a wiping out of the past, an equivalent ideological feat to that attempted by Jones on 18 November 1978.
There is a sense that, despite this performance and the momentary recuperation of a more expansive horizon than the claustrophobic one created by Jones's omnipresent voice over the camp's loudspeakers, another act of violence is imminent. Jonestown, in being remembered, forms something like what Hélène Cixous calls a "stigmata." Bracketing Cixous's rather Catholic figure for this form of remembrance, we might nonetheless find that, although D'Aguiar describes Jonestown as having left a psychic scar on both his poem's speaker and on an international collective memory, its effects are different from a scar. Rather, Jonestown remains an open wound for D'Aguiar's speaker and for us, something that "wounds and spurs, stimulates" (Cixous xiii). Put another way, Bill of Rights does not cover up Jonestown's memory but digs into its violence in the hope of opening up another possible future, "the promise of a text" (xiv). This seems an especially apt characterization of the reopening of Jonestown's wound that D'Aguiar achieves so powerfully by engaging with a ritual process whose closure leaves us with more stings than salves, more impossibilities than answers. In these impossibilities there is, paradoxically perhaps, hope for the ending of settler-colonial time. representations of race and trauma, Rinaldo Walcott writes compellingly about the traumas of slavery, and his view of the process of psychic healing stands parallel to the one I read in terms of D'Aguiar's poetics in that both processes require a reconnection and reintegration to be made after a radical separation or rupture. For Walcott, to be a New World black person involves both reconnection with a "severed 'Mother Africa'" and the making of a reparation by "breaking away from the mother" and "loving the creolized self" (147). 2. For much of the poem, the speaker says about his lover that she is simply "Someone's wife, she was Waiyaki or Makusi" (D'Aguiar, Bill 27). After her suicide/infanticide, she takes on the name "Tikka" (60).
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